The copywriter is president associated with the centre for liberal tips in sofia and fellow in the institute for human sciences, iwm vienna

The present european trip of mike pompeo, us assistant of condition, included visits tothe czech republic,austriaand slovenia. it concluded using inkingof a bilateral us-polish military agreement. it was as if president donald trumps administration had made a decision to resurrect the once-powerful habsburg kingdom inside hope of keeping germany down and russia out-of european countries. consolidating a strategic bloc of nations in the eu being suspicious ofrussia and germany seems to be at the heart for this administrations plan towards european countries.

As wess mitchell, an old us assistant secretary of condition and gifted republican strategist, has seen, a german-led european countries would most likely mean a russia-friendly europe. the european hope of retiring from record would turn into a nightmare due to the fact, while he remarked, irrelevance ...is perhaps not an extravagance that a strategically sandwiched, geopolitically declining, multinational great power are able to afford.

If, as seems likely, mr trump thinks your eus disintegration is within us passions, the greater slight view of mr pompeo andmr mitchell is the fact that neither the eus implosion nor its strategic autonomy would be. just what could be in americas interest, nonetheless,is theconsolidationofa distinct selection of eu states which derive their particular safety guarantees and impact from their specialrelationship using the us.

In americasnew foreign policythinking around apost-brexiteu,such allies arethe best hedge against the decline ofus influenceon the old continent. mr pompeo thinks that main europeans are americas normal allies. vienna should change berlin once the political money of main europe. sebastian kurz, the traditional austrian chancellor, who's often crucial of angela merkel, his german equivalent, appears an even more encouraging leader of a us-friendly, ex-habsburg bloc.

Were mr trump to be re-elected, washington would probably hew to this strategy as relations with nations eg polandand hungary flourished. for this united states management, to visit central europe can be as inspiring as to campaign inside midwest. illiberal governments in central europe view mr trump as an ideological ally, many admire vladimir putin, russias president. but can the us habsburg strategysurvive if mr trump loses?can a pro-us bloc inside eu, built in mr trumps time, outlast him?

My hunch is typically not. paradoxically, mr trumps electoral defeat might end up being the most useful opportunity for realising the berlin-paris dream of a sovereign europe. not merely would a joe biden victoryimprove relations between washington and berlin, and washington and paris, but it would impel illiberal governments in warsaw and budapest to get reconciliation with brussels.

Three elements willdefine this post-trump dynamic amongst the united states and eu, and interior european relations.

A recently available review commissioned by the european council on foreign relations revealed that washingtonsresponse to covid-19 has badly damaged americasimage in european countries. seventy-oneper penny of danes, 68 percent of french, 65 per cent of germans and 38 per centof poles state that their view for the us has exploded even worse.many europeans started initially to matter americas capability despite mr trump sought to try out the part of worldwide leader.deep issue that domestic issues will bog-down the usa causes many atlanticists to seek a stronger role for eu in the world.

Second,the increasing reality of us-chinese confrontation changes transatlantic relations. the united states will be needing an eu powerful enough to take care of itself against threats via its area. neither an innovative new administrations expected give attention to weather modification, nor washingtons search for a standard front against asia, justifies putting the former habsburg states during the center folks relations with european countries. weakening germany can't be the primary objective of every us administration that really would like to co-operate with all the eu.

Third, and most considerably, illiberal democracies such as for instance poland and hungary, which have been unabashed backers of mr trumps populist change, and which honestly or tacitly opposed the idea of eu strategic autonomy, would view a biden management as an a priori governmental menace. a trump defeat in november would enable liberal forces in main europe at any given time whenever recent occasions in belarus are a clear sign that aging is the worst opponent of populist strongmen such as viktor orban, hungarys prime minister since 2010.

Mr trumps triumph in 2016 made many liberal europeans fantasise in regards to the likelihood of eu strategic autonomy. ironically, it might be mr trumps electoral beat that persuades his populist backers in main european countries to promote the franco-german demand for equivalent objective.